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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
D.L. v. SHEPPARD PRATT HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.: A JUVENILE’S
POST-RELEASE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IS NOT
MOOT DUE TO COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES STEMMING
FROM INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION.
By: Cooper Gerus
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a petition for judicial review
of an involuntary admission to a mental health facility is not moot when
possible collateral consequences flow from such admissions. D.L. v.
Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 342, 214 A.3d 521, 522
(2019). D.L. faced possible collateral consequences, including the impact of
her involuntary admission on future employment outcomes and court
proceedings, her ability to own firearms and obtain a driver’s license, and the
social stigmatization associated with mental illness. Id. at 377-78, 214 A.3d
at 543-44. The court ultimately remanded D.L.’s case to the circuit court to
determine whether “no less restrictive” treatment was available. Id. at 34647, 214 A.3d at 525.
In March 2015, D.L., a fourteen-year-old in the custody of the Department
of Social Services (“DSS”), was taken to MedStar Southern Maryland
Hospital to be treated for self-inflicted wounds. She was diagnosed with
depressive disorder. The doctors determined that D.L. presented a danger to
herself and others and that admission to an institutional inpatient care and
treatment facility was necessary. D.L. was brought to Sheppard Pratt-Ellicott
City (“Sheppard Pratt”) on March 26, 2015. D.L. could not be voluntarily
admitted because she was in the care and custody of DSS, and required an
involuntary commitment hearing conducted by an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) to determine whether there were less restrictive means of treatment
available to D.L. At the hearing, the record reflected that DSS attempted to
place D.L. in a less restrictive facility. D.L. had been placed in a psychiatric
facility once before, though it was unclear whether the prior admission had
been involuntary, or whether she was voluntarily admitted by a parent or
guardian. None of the alternative facilities had open beds, so the ALJ ordered
D.L. to be involuntarily admitted at Sheppard Pratt, where she stayed from
March 26, 2015, to April 10, 2015.
Once released, D.L. filed a petition for judicial review of the ALJ’s
decision in the Circuit Court for Howard County on May 1, 2015. The circuit
court granted Sheppard Pratt’s motion to dismiss D.L.’s petition on July 28,
2015, without holding a hearing on the merits. D.L. then appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals. The court dismissed D.L.’s petition as moot and

2020]

D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health System, Inc.

161

held that any collateral consequences of her present admission already existed
due to her prior admission to a psychiatric facility. D.L. filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which was granted.
The court considered de novo whether the Court of Special Appeals erred
in finding D.L.’s challenge to involuntary admission was moot, and that no
mootness exceptions applied. D.L., 465 Md. at 350, 214 A.3d at 527. D.L.’s
only contention in her petition for review was that there might have been a
less restrictive form of intervention available. Id. at 351, 214 A.3d at 528;
Health-General Article (“HG”) § 10-617(a)(5).
The court began by noting that the presumption of mootness arises when
no judicable case or controversy exists between the parties, and a reviewing
court is at risk of rendering an advisory opinion. D.L., 465 Md. at 352, 214
A.3d at 528 (citing In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 452, 906 A.2d 915 (2006);
Adkins v. State, 324 Md. 641, 646, 598 A.2d 194 (1991)). In order to
overcome mootness, a petitioner must demonstrate that “collateral
consequences flow from a lower court’s decision.” Id. at 352, 214 A.3d at
528 (citing Adkins, 324 Md. at 645–46, 598 A.2d at 194). The court analyzed
the collateral consequences of D.L.’s involuntary admission to Sheppard
Pratt. Id. at 352, 214 A.3d at 528. The court analyzed Supreme Court
precedent, then reviewed the doctrine of collateral consequences under
Maryland law. Id.
In Fiswick v. United States, the Supreme Court developed what would be
known as the doctrine of collateral consequences. D.L., 465 Md. at 353, 214
A.3d at 529 (citing Fiswick, 329 U.S. 211, 213 (1946)). The Court cited civil
consequences flowing from a criminal conviction such as the risk of
deportation, impact on voting rights, and the ability to sit on a jury or hold
public office. Id. These consequences did not render a petition for review
moot despite the petitioner’s release from custody. Id.
In Pollard v. United States, the Court held the mere possibility of
collateral consequences flowing from a disposition justified a post-release
hearing on the merits. Id. at 354, 214 A.3d at 530 (citing Pollard, 352 U.S.
354, 358 (1957)). In Carafas v. LaVallee, the Court held that an appeal is not
moot when statutorily imposed disabilities and burdens outlast a criminal
conviction. Id. at 355, 214 A.3d at 530 (citing Carafas, 391 U.S. 234, 237–
38 (1968)). The doctrine was limited in Lane v. Williams where the Court,
reinforcing Carafas, held that discretionary, non-statutory consequences do
not overcome mootness. Id. at 355-56, 214 A.3d at 531 (citing Lane, 455 U.S.
624, 632-33 (1982)). Such consequences include decisions by employers or
judges in future proceedings. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland identified several circumstances
which, while not concrete or actual, implicate possible collateral
consequences to overcome mootness. D.L., 465 Md. at 357, 214 A.3d at 531
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(citing Adkins, 324 Md. at 654, 598 A.2d 194). For example, the collateral
consequences of a prior disposition may impact a petitioner in future child
custody proceedings. Id. at 357, 214 A.3d at 531 (citing In re Kaela C., 394
Md. at 475–76, 906 A.2d 915). They also may restrict one’s driving
privileges, access to employment opportunities, ability to serve on a federal
jury, join the military, and own firearms. Id. at 358, 214 A.3d at 532 (citing
Kranz v. State, 459 Md. 456, 473, 187 A.3d 66 (2018); Toler v. Motor Vehicle
Admin., 373 Md. 214, 216, 817 A.2d 229 (2003)). Involuntary admissions
may impact statutory reporting requirements, immigration status, future
admission proceedings, and impose the social stigma associated with
involuntary admission and mental illness. D.L., 456 Md. at 360-61, 214 A.3d
at 533-534. The court reviewed each collateral consequence as it applied to
D.L. Id. at 360, 214 A.3d at 533.
The court found that statutorily imposed collateral consequences to D.L.’s
driving privileges exist under TA § 16-103.1(3), which bars anyone with a
mental disorder from obtaining a driver’s license without being adjudged
“competent.” D.L., 465 Md. at 361, 214 A.3d at 534. The court also
considered collateral consequences in future guardianship and child custody
proceedings. D.L., 465 Md. at 365, 214 A.3d at 536. Local agencies are
required to compile a report on a guardian’s suitability, which would uncover
past involuntary admissions. Id. The court found that D.L. faces no collateral
consequences in future naturalization proceedings, but that such inquiries are
case-specific and could impact other individuals. Id. at 367, 214 A.3d at 537.
The court also discussed the impact of an involuntary admission on D.L.’s
employment prospects. Id. at 362, 214 A.3d at 534. Sheppard Pratt asserted
that employment regulations, which are not an outright ban, mitigate any
collateral consequences, rendering her petition moot. Id. Contrarily, the
court emphasized that the mere possibility of collateral consequences
overcomes mootness and that statutory regulations are insufficient mitigators.
Id. at 363, 214 A.3d at 535.
The court reached a similar conclusion concerning collateral
consequences in future involuntary admission proceedings, noting that while
HG § 10-632(e) limits the use of prior involuntary admissions, it does not
completely bar their introduction in future proceedings. Id. at 370-71, 214
A.3d at 539-40. The court again found that D.L. faced collateral
consequences concerning firearm ownership and found that though statutes
limit when information concerning D.L.’s involuntary admission could be
used in purchasing them, any mitigation here would be “ad hoc.” Id. at 37076, 214 A.3d at 539-43. Finally, although D.L. had been previously admitted
to a facility, it was unclear whether this was an involuntary admission. Id. at
380, 214 A.3d at 545. Had it been a voluntary admission, D.L. would face
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no collateral consequences. Id. Since her March 2015 admission was
involuntary, D.L. faces collateral consequences. Id.
In D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt, the court held that D.L. faces possible collateral
consequences flowing from her involuntary admission, which render her
petition for judicial review not moot. Mootness inquiries are highly factspecific; each case requires a focused analysis as to whether collateral
consequences stem from a lower court’s disposition. Such inquiries are
particularly relevant in cases concerning minors and among individuals in
psychiatric facilities, because the impact of a disposition may extend beyond
the proceedings to the rest of a person’s life. This decision further clarifies
the situations in which mootness could be raised and may lead to an extension
of the collateral consequences doctrine to other areas of law.

